yzSameness and Substance
yҁzDavid Wiggins
yoŁzBasil Blackwell, Oxford
ypzLibrary of Philosophy and Logic
yŐzxii+238 pp.
yISBNz0-631-19090-2 (hardcover)
ylzgc{h1967NɏołꂽwIdentity and the Spatio-Temporal ContinuityxD^{̉ŁwSameness and Substance Renewedx2001NɏoD

Preface v
Preamble 1

1. The absoluteness of sameness

1. A central problem of identity; and the theses of absoluteness and relativity of identity 15
2. Leibniz's Law and the difficulties of relative identity 18
3. Five ways for it to be false that a=[g]b 23
4. Possible examples of type-(4) relativity 27
5. Some zases that might be alleged to be of type-(5) 28
6. Discussion of type-(4) cases 30
7. Discussion of type-(5) cases and some attempted amendments of Leibniz's Law 35
8. A mathematical example supposedly of type-(5) 42
9. Conclusion concerning the Relativity of Identity, Thesis _R_ 43

2. Outline of a theory of individuation

1. Proposition _D_ and the rationale of the 'same what?' question 47
2. The identity of indiscernibles 55
3. Proposition _D_ further explicated and amplified: preliminaries 57
4. _D_(ii) as the proper development of _D_ 60
5. The argument for _D_(ii) 62
6. Lot's wife: and the notion of existence 66
7. Further _D_ principles 68
8. Counting and some related concerns 71

3. Sortal concepts: and the characteristic activity or function or purpose of their compliants

1. The sortal predicates of natural kinds 77
2. The other sortal predicates 86
3. Problems of artificial identity 90
4. Two approaches to the problem of artificial identity 94
5. Summary of conclusions to date: and a methodological remark 99
6. Transitions to Chapters Four and Five 100

4. Essentialism and conceptualism

1. Independence from the explicitly modal of the foregoing theory of individuation 103
2. Principles and maxims governing the derivation of a modest essentialism 104
3. The necessity of identity, and some asymmetrical necessities 109
4. Conceivability, theory and essence 112
5. Conceivability continued 115
6. Individuative essentialism and its consequences 117
7. That the logical impropriety and the usefulness of 'haecceitas' fly match the syntactic impropriety of the word 120
8. The essentialist 'must' and 'can' 120
9. Avoiding overspecificity 121
10. The essences of artifacts; and the essences of works of art 125

5. Conceptualism and realism

1. Anti-realist conceptualism and anti-conceptualist realism 129
2. Four clarification 131
3. A conventionalist reconstruction of our modal convictions: a conceptualist anti-realist view of essence 134
4. An hypothesis concerning the sources of anti-essentialism 137
5. An exaggeration of conceptualism, deprecated and memded by some truisms: and reply to the anti-conceptualist realist begun 138
6. The perfect consonance of solar realism and sober conceptualism 141
7. The realist requirement restated, refurbished and satisfied 142
8. Concluding suggestions 145

6. Personal identity

1. John Locke on persons 149
2. An objection of Joseph Butler: the charge of circularity 152
3. Another line of objection, and the requirement of continuity of consciousness restated to counter the charge of absurdity 154
4. The inadequacy of Ip, as of any pure or physicalistically uncontaminated 'remembering' condition of mental continuity. The involvement of remembering with the physical 155
5. The charge of circularity rephrased and reconsidered as a charge of non-effectiveness 160
6. Two senses in which a person may be supposed to transcend his body, one correct, the other impossible 163
7. Real possibility: the limits of personhood 169
8. The limits of personhood continued: and a formal difference between the _vegetable_ and _person_ concepts 173
9. Amnesia reconsidered, and man as a animal 176
10. Persons as social constructs and persons as given 179
11. Nature and naturalism 182
12. Conclusion: the abandonment of the *C condition: a small amendment to Locke; and an inconclusive postscript on the brain 187

Contents to Longer Notes 190
Longer Notes 191
Bibliography 225
Index 231